, is an interdisciplinary center with an international outlook and a focus on teaching and research in finance. It was created at the beginning of 1992 to channel the financial research interests of a multidisciplinary group of professors at IESE Business School and has established itself as a nucleus of study within the School's activities.
The beta is one of the most important but elusive parameters in finance. According to the CAPM, it is a measure of the so-called systematic risk. We differentiate the historical beta from the expected beta, the historical beta being the one we get from the regression of historical data, and the expected beta being the relevant one for estimating the cost of equity (the required return on equity).
Historical betas are used for several purposes:
-To calculate the cost of equity of companies -To rank assets and portfolios with respect to systematic risk -To test CAPM and mean-variance efficiency We argue that historical betas (calculated from historical data) are useless for all three purposes.
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) defines the required return to equity in the following terms:
R F = rate of return for risk-free investments (Treasury bonds) E (β i ) = expected equity's beta of company i. E(R M ) = expected market return.
[E(R M ) -R F ] = market risk premium Therefore, given certain values for the equity's beta, the risk-free rate and the market risk premium, it is possible to calculate the required return to equity. The market risk premium is the difference between the expected return on the market portfolio and the riskfree rate, which in the context of the CAPM is equal to the incremental return demanded by investors on stocks, above that of risk-free investments.
When estimating betas the standard procedure is to use five years of monthly data and a value-weighted index. This procedure is widely used in academic research and by commercial beta providers such as Merrill Lynch and Ibbotson and Associates. However, different beta sources provide us with different betas, as is shown in Table 1 . Bruner et al. (1998) also found sizeable differences among beta providers. For their sample the average beta according to Bloomberg was 1.03, whereas according to Value Line it was 1.24. We show that, in general, it is an enormous error to use the historical beta as a proxy for the expected beta. First, because it is almost impossible to calculate a meaningful beta because historical betas change dramatically from one day to the next; second, because very often we cannot say with a relevant statistical confidence that the beta of one company is smaller or bigger than the beta of another; third, because historical betas do not make much sense in many cases: high-risk companies very often have smaller historical betas than lowrisk companies; fourth, because historical betas depend very much on which index we use to calculate them.
Those results are far from being new. For example, Damodaran (2001, page Damodaran (1994) also makes this point by calculating the beta of Disney. With daily data, he gets 1.33; 1.38 with weekly data; 1.13 with monthly data; 0.44 with quarterly data; and 0.77 with annual data. With a 3-year period, he gets 1.04; 1.13 with 5 years; and 1.18 with 10 years. Also, the beta depends on the index taken as the benchmark; thus, the beta with respect to the Dow 30 is 0.99; with respect to the S&P 500, it is 1.13, and with respect to the Wilshire 5000, it is 1.05.
We calculate the betas using monthly data every day of the month, not only data of the last day of the month as has usually been done. By doing this, the fact that calculated betas change a lot becomes much clearer. We calculate historical betas for 3,813 companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange (1,462) and the Nasdaq (2,351) each day in the 2-month period December 1, 2001 -January 31, 2002 using 5 years of monthly data 1 . Each day's betas are calculated betas with respect to the S&P 500, using 60 monthly returns. For example, on December 18, 2001, the beta is calculated by running a regression of the 60 monthly returns of the company calculated on the 18th of every month, on the 60 monthly returns of the S&P 500 calculated on the 18th of every month. We have included only companies that traded in December 1996. Because of this criterion, our sample includes only 450 of the 500 companies that were in the S&P 500 in December 2001.
Historical betas change dramatically from one day to the next
The results show that historical betas change dramatically from one day to the next.
Tables 2 and 3 report some statistics about the 62 calculated betas of the 3,813 companies in our sample with respect to the S&P 500 in the two-month period of December 2001 and January 2002. Table 2 shows that only 2,780 companies (73%) had positive betas on the 62 consecutive days. Only 434 companies (11%) had betas bigger than one on the 62 consecutive days. And 2,927 companies (77%) had, in the sample period, a maximum beta more than two times bigger than their minimum beta. Of the 450 companies in the S&P 500, 52% had a maximum beta more than two times bigger than their minimum beta. Of the 30 companies in the DJIA, 40% had a maximum beta more than two times bigger than their minimum beta. Looking at the 101 industry betas, 25% (31%) of the industries had a maximum weighted (unweighted) beta more than two times bigger than their minimum beta. Table 2 . Historical betas of the 3,813 companies in our sample with respect to the S&P 500
Betas are calculated each day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02 using 5 years of monthly data, i.e. on December 18, 2001, the beta is calculated by running a regression of the 60 monthly returns of the company on the 60 monthly returns of the S&P 500, the returns of each month being calculated on the 18th of each month. The table shows that 2,780 companies (with a combined market capitalization of $11,956 billion) had positive 3 1 For example, Brealey and Myers (2000, page 224 ) also calculate historical betas using 60 monthly returns. Betas are calculated each day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02 using 5 years of monthly data, i.e. on December 18, 2001, the beta is calculated by running a regression of the 60 monthly returns of the company on the 60 monthly returns of the S&P 500. The returns of each month are calculated on the 18th of each month. The table contains the median, the average, the maximum, and the minimum, of: -Beta average: the average of the 62 betas calculated for each company and industry every day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02.
-Max -Min: maximum beta minus minimum beta of the 62 betas calculated for each company and industry every day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02.
-Abs (Max / Min): absolute value of the maximum beta divided by the minimum beta of the 62 betas calculated every day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02.
-(MAX-Min) / Abs (Beta December 31): maximum beta minus minimum beta of the 62 betas calculated for each company and industry every day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02 divided by the absolute value of the beta calculated on December 31, 2001. Table 3 shows that the median of the averages of the 62 betas calculated for each company was 0.72 for the 3,813 companies in our full sample, 0.82 for the 450 companies in the S&P 500, and 0.88 for the 30 companies in the DJIA. The median of the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the 62 betas calculated for each company was 0.88 for the 3,813 companies in our full sample, 0.63 for the 450 companies in the S&P 500, and 0.53 for the 30 companies in the DJIA. Note that the difference between the maximum and the minimum is smaller than 4 because we have eliminated 127 companies for which this difference was bigger than 4. The median of the absolute value of the ratio between the maximum and the minimum of the 62 betas calculated for each company was 3.07 for the 3,813 companies in our full sample, 2.11 for the 450 companies in the S&P 500 and 1.77 for the 30 companies in the DJIA. The median of the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the 62 betas calculated for each company, divided by the beta calculated on December 31, 2001, was 1.31 for the 3,813 companies in our full sample, 0.76 for the 450 companies in the S&P 500, and 0.52 for the 30 companies in the DJIA. This statistic was 0.49 for the 101 industry weighted betas, and 0.44 for the 101 industry unweighted betas. From Tables 2 and 3 it is clear that industry betas have less dispersion than company betas. The betas of the 30 companies in the DJIA have, on average, less dispersion than those of the 450 companies in the S&P 500, and these have, on average, less dispersion than those of the 3,813 companies of the full sample. We understand by less dispersion that:
1. the median and the average of the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the 62 betas calculated for each company is closer to zero, 2. the median and the average of the absolute value of the ratio between the maximum and the minimum of the 62 betas calculated for each company is closer to one, and 3. the median and the average of the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the 62 betas calculated for each company, divided by the beta calculated on December 31, 2001, is closer to zero. Table 4 contains the range of variation of the maximum beta minus the minimum beta of the 62 betas calculated for each company and industry every day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02. For only seven companies was the difference between the maximum beta and the minimum beta smaller than 0.2. Table 4 also contains the maximum beta minus minimum beta of the 62 betas calculated for each company and industry every day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02 divided by the absolute value of the beta calculated on December 31, 2001. (January 15, 2002) . A closer look at the data shows that the beta of AT&T is higher than the beta of Boeing 32% of the days, and is higher than the beta of Coca-Cola 50% of the days. The beta of Boeing is higher than the beta of Coca-Cola 76% of the days. AT&T has the maximum beta (of the three companies) 29% of the days and the minimum beta 47% of the days. Boeing has the maximum beta (of the three companies) 58% of the days and the minimum beta 15% of the days. Coca-Cola has the maximum beta (of the three companies) 13% of the days and the minimum beta 38% of the day These three tables and three figures are evidence enough to conclude that calculated betas are very unstable. Table 5 contains some statistics of the correlation, and of the company volatility divided by the market volatility of the S&P 500 for the 30 companies in the DJIA in the twomonth period of December 2001 and January 2002. On average, the maximum divided by its minimum was 2.51 for the correlation, while it was only 1.28 for the ratio of volatilities.
It is clear that the volatility of the betas is mainly a story of volatility of the correlations. Table 5 shows that, on average, the market price of the shares and the S&P 500 moved in the same direction (both increased or both decreased) only 58% of the months and 48.7% of the days in the 5-year period 1/1/1997-31/12/2001). On average, the maximum divided by its minimum was 2.51 for the correlation, while it was only 1.28 for the ratio of volatilities. Correlations and volatilities calculated using 60 monthly data. 
Implications for making beta-ranked portfolios
We ordered the 3,813 companies by decreasing betas on December 1, 2001 and constructed 20 portfolios. Portfolio 1 had the companies with the highest betas and portfolio 20 had the companies with the lowest betas. Then we calculated the beta of the portfolios (weighted by market capitalization) each day of the following two months. Table 7 shows that in the following two months, 300 portfolios were misallocated (i.e. on 26 days, portfolio 5 had lower beta than portfolio 6). On 53 days (out of 62 days) there were portfolios misallocated. : 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 20 and 22. January: 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 22. 4 December: 3, 4, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31. January: 3, 4, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 and 30 . 2 9 days 0
Having ordered the 3,813 companies by decreasing betas on December 1, 2001, we constructed 3,613 portfolios of 200 shares each following a moving window. We also calculated the beta of those 3,613 portfolios on December 15, 2001. Figure 4 shows the results. Betas of low beta portfolios increased, and betas of high beta portfolios decreased from December 1 to December 15. Figure 5 shows the difference of the two betas (December 1 and December 15) for each portfolio. Figure 5 also shows the difference of the betas on December 15 between each portfolio (N) and the portfolio that had the immediate lower beta (N-1) on December 1. On December 15, this difference was negative in 1,520 cases. We also formed portfolios in the Fama and French (1992) way on December 1 and on December 15, 2001. Table 8 shows that on average 71.3% of the companies changed from one portfolio on December 1 to another on December 15. Fama and French (1992) Portfolios are formed on December 1 and on December 15, 2001. The breakpoints for the size (log of Market Value of Equity, ME, in million $) are determined using all NYSE stocks (1,462) in our sample. All NYSE and Nasdaq stocks are allocated to the 10 size portfolios using the NYSE breakpoints. Then, each size decile is subdivided into 10 ß portfolios using the betas of individual stocks, estimated with 5 years of monthly returns ending in December 1, 2001 in the first case, and in December 15, 2001 in the second. The betas of the portfolios are estimated with 5 years of monthly returns with respect to the S&P 500.
All Low-β β-2 β-3 β-4 β-5 β-6 β-7 β-8 β-9 High-β 3. Historical betas depend very much on which index we use to calculate them Table 9 presents the historical relative betas of the 30 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index. Relative betas are calculated by dividing the beta with respect to an index on a given day by the beta with respect to another index on the same day. For the 2-month period 1/12/01-31/1/02, the table contains the maximum, the minimum, the average, and maximum divided by the minimum. It may be seen that, on average, the beta with respect to the S&P 500 was smaller than the beta with respect to the DJIA and higher than the beta with respect to the W5000. Table 9 permits to conclude that relative betas also change dramatically. Table 9 . Historical relative betas of the 30 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index.
Relative betas are calculated by dividing the beta with respect to one index on a given day by the beta with respect to another index on the same day. For example, the relative beta "Beta S&P 500 / Beta DJ IND" is calculated by dividing the beta with respect to the S&P 500 on a given day by the beta with respect to the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index on the same day.
The 4. We cannot say that the beta of a company is smaller or bigger than the beta of another Table 10 presents the beta ranking of the 3,813 companies in our sample in the month of December 31, 2001. Each day, companies are ranked from 1 (the company with the lowest beta on that day) to 3,813 (the company with the highest beta on that day). Betas are calculated each day with respect to the S&P 500 using 5 years of monthly data. It may be seen that the average change in ranking for all 3,813 companies in December 2001 is 1,542 ranking positions.
The average beta ranking change was: 233 positions from one day to the next; 479 positions from one day to the next week; and 564 positions over a two-week period. 5. High-risk companies very often have smaller historical betas than low-risk companies Table 11 reports the calculated betas as of December 31, 2001 of the 30 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index. Companies are sorted by ascending beta with respect to the S&P 500. According to the S&P 500 betas, Philip Morris is the company with lowest cost of equity, much smaller than GE or Wall Mart. If we assume that the riskfree rate is 5%, that the market risk premium is 4.5%, and that historical betas are a good proxy for expected betas, then the cost of equity of Philip Morris, GE and Wall Mart is 6.0%, 10.2% and 9.1%, respectively. We do not think that this makes much economic sense. 6. Weak correlation between beta and realized return Table 12 shows the small correlation between the betas and the realized returns of portfolios of 200 companies sorted by realized return. 
About the recommendation of using Industry betas
Some authors recommend using industry betas, instead of company betas. For example, Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) recommend "checking several reliable sources because beta estimates vary considerably… If the betas from several sources vary by more than 0.2 or the beta for a company is more than 0.3 from the industry average, consider using the industry average. An industry average beta is typically more stable and reliable than an individual company beta because measurement errors tend to cancel out". But about the CAPM, they conclude (see their page 225), "It takes a better theory to kill an existing theory, and we have not seen the better theory yet. Therefore, we continue to use the CAPM, being wary of all the problems with estimating it." We rather think that a rejection is enough to beat a model.
We have shown that industry betas are quite unstable. Figure 10 shows the relationship between the market-to-book ratio and the historical beta of portfolios of 200 companies ranked by MV/BV (market-to-book ratio). The figure plots the 200 companies' rolling average beta on December 1 and on December 15. On average, higher MV/BV (market-to-book ratio) companies had higher beta. 
Historical betas and the market-to-book ratio

Conclusion
We have shown that, in general, it is an enormous error to use the historical beta as a proxy for the expected beta. First, because it is almost impossible to calculate a meaningful beta because historical betas change dramatically from one day to the next; second, because very often we cannot say with a relevant statistical confidence that the beta of one company is smaller or bigger than the beta of another; third, because historical betas do not make much sense in many cases: high-risk companies very often have smaller historical betas than lowrisk companies; fourth, because historical betas depend very much on which index we use to calculate them.
We calculate betas of 3,813 companies using 60 monthly returns each day of December 2001 and January 2002. We report that the maximum beta of a company was, on average, 15.7 times its minimum beta. The median of the maximum beta divided by the minimum beta was 3.07. The median of the percentage daily change (in absolute value) of the betas was 20%, and the median of the percentage (in absolute value) of the betas was 43%.
Industry betas are also unstable. The median (average) of the percentage daily change (in absolute value) of the industry betas was 7% (16%), and the median (average) of the percentage (in absolute value) of the industry betas was 15% (38%). On average, the maximum beta of an industry was 2.7 times its minimum beta in December 2001 and January 2002.
This dispersion of the calculated betas also has important implications for the instability of beta-ranked portfolios. Literature review about the CAPM Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) demonstrate that, in equilibrium, a financial asset's return must be positively linearly related to its beta (ß), a measure of systematic risk or co-movement with the market portfolio return: E (R i ) = a 1 + a 2 E (β i ), for all assets i, [1] where E (R i )) is the expected return on asset i, E (β i ) is asset i's expected market beta, a 1 is the expected return on a "zero-beta" portfolio, and a 2 is the market risk premium.
The CAPM of Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) is predicated on the assumption of a positive systematic risk-return tradeoff and asserts that the expected return for any security is a positive function of three variables: expected beta, expected market return, and the risk-free rate. The basic assumptions of the CAPM are:
1. Investors have homogeneous expectations about asset returns that have a joint normal distribution;
2. Investors are risk-averse individuals who maximize the expected utility of their end-of-period wealth;
3. Markets are frictionless and information is costless and simultaneously available to all investors; there are no imperfections such as taxes, regulations, or restrictions on short selling;
4. There exists a risk-free asset such that investors may borrow and lend unlimited amounts at the risk-free rate.
However, subsequent work by (among many others) Basu (1977) , Banz (1981) , Reinganum (1981) , Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) , Keim (1983 Keim ( , 1985 2 and Fama and French (1992) suggests that either:
1. expected returns are determined not only by the beta and the expected market risk premium but also by non-risk characteristics such as book-to-market ratio, firm size, price-earnings ratio and dividend yield. It implies that the CAPM is misspecified and requires the addition of factors other than beta to explain security returns, or 2. the historical beta has little (or nothing) to do with the expected beta. To put it another way: the problems of measuring beta are systematically related to 21 2 Basu (1977) found that low price/earnings portfolios have higher returns than could be explained by the CAPM. Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) found that smaller firms tend to have high abnormal rates of return. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) found that the market requires higher rates of return on equities with high dividend yield. Keim (1983 Keim ( , 1985 reports the January effect, that is, seasonality in stock returns. Tinic and West (1984) reject the validity of the CAPM based on intertemporal inconsistencies due to the January effect.
variables such as firm size and book-to-market ratio. And also the historical market risk premium has little (or nothing) to do with the expected market risk premium, or 3. the heterogeneity of expectations 3 in cross-section returns, volatilities and covariances, and market returns is the reason why it makes no sense to talk about an aggregate market CAPM, although at the individual level expected CAPM does work. It means that while individuals are well characterized by CAPM, and each individual uses an expected beta, an expected market risk premium, and an expected cash flow stream to value each security, all individuals do not agree on these three magnitudes for each security. Consequently, it makes no sense to refer to a "market" expected beta for a security or to a "market" expected market risk premium (or to a "market" expected cash flow stream), for the simple reason that they do not exist.
We may find out an investor's expected IBM beta by asking him. However, it is impossible to determine the expected IBM beta for the market as a whole, because it does not exist. Even if we knew the expected market risk premiums and the expected IBM betas of the different investors who operated on the market, it would be meaningless to talk of an expected IBM beta for the market as a whole. The rationale for this is to be found in the aggregation theorems of microeconomics, which in actual fact are non-aggregation theorems. A model that works well individually for a number of people may not work for all of the people together 4 . For the CAPM, this means that although the CAPM may be a valid model for each investor, it is not valid for the market as a whole, because investors do not have the same return and risk expectations for all shares. The prices are a statement of expected cash flows discounted at a rate that includes the expected market risk premium and the expected beta. Different investors have different cash flow expectations and different future risk expectations (different expected market risk premium and different expected beta). One could only talk of a market risk premium if all investors had the same expectations.
The problem with the expected beta is that investors do not have homogeneous expectations. If they did, it would make sense to talk of a market risk premium and of an IBM beta common to all investors because all investors would hold the market portfolio. However, expectations are not homogeneous.
22
3 Lintner (1969) argued that the existence of heterogeneous expectations does not critically alter the CAPM in some simplified scenarios. In some cases, expected returns are expressed as complex weighted averages of investors' expectations. But if investors have heterogeneous expectations of expected prices and covariance matrices, the market portfolio is not necessarily efficient and this makes the CAPM non-testable. Lintner (1969) says "in the (undoubtedly more realistic) case with different assessments of covariance matrices, the market's assessment of the expected ending price for any security depends on every investor's assessment of the expected ending price for every security and every element in the investor's assessment of his NxN covariance matrix (N is the number of securities), as well as the risk tolerance of every investor." 4 As Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page 120) say: "It is not true that whenever aggregate demand can be generated by a representative consumer, this representative consumer's preferences have normative contents. It may even be the case that a positive representative consumer exists but that there is no social welfare function that leads to a normative representative consumer." The market risk premium is the difference The market risk premium is NOT the difference between the expected return on the market between the expected return on the market portfolio and the risk-free rate portfolio and the risk-free rate
Measurement errors and problems
Original tests of the CAPM focused on whether the intercept in a cross-sectional regression was higher or lower than the risk-free rate, and whether stock individual variance entered into cross-sectional regressions. Scholes and Williams (1977) found that with nonsyncronous trading of securities, ordinary least squares estimators of beta coefficients using daily data are both biased and inconsistent. Roll (1977) concludes that the only legitimate test of the CAPM is whether or not the market portfolio (which includes all assets) is mean-variance efficient. The Roll critique does not imply that the CAPM is an invalid theory. However, it does mean that tests of the CAPM must be interpreted with great caution. Roll (1981) suggests that infrequent trading of shares of small firms may explain much of the measurement error in estimating their betas. Constantinides (1982) points out that with consumer heterogeneity "in the intertemporal extension of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, an asset's risk premium is determined not only by its covariance with the market return, but also by its covariance with the m-1 state variables" (m is the number of heterogeneous consumers). He also points out that the assumption of complete markets is needed for demand aggregation. But markets are not complete. Shapiro (1984, 1986) find an insignificant relationship between beta and returns and a significant relationship between market capitalization and returns Shanken (1992) presents an integrated econometric view of maximum-likelihood methods and two-pass approaches to estimating historical betas. Roll and Ross (1994) attribute the observed lack of a systematic relation between risk and return to the possible mean-variance inefficiency of the market portfolio proxies. Shalit and Yitzhaki (2002) argue that the Ordinary Least-Squares regression estimator is inappropriate for estimating betas. They suggest alternative estimators for beta that are robust with respect to extreme fluctuations in the market return. Using CRSP daily data from 1984 to 1993, they eliminate the highest four and the lowest four market returns and show that the betas of the 75% of the firms change by more than one standard error. For example, the beta of General Electric changes from 1.16 to 1.23 and the beta of Coca-Cola changes from 1.22 to 1.18. Avramov (2002) uses Bayesian model averaging to analyze the sample evidence on return predictability in the presence of model uncertainty. The analysis reveals in-sample and out-of-sample predictability, and shows that the out-of-sample performance of the Bayesian approach is superior to that of model selection criteria. She finds that market premia are robust predictors. Moreover, small-cap value stocks appear more predictable than large-cap growth stocks. She also investigates the implications of model uncertainty from investment management perspectives. She shows that model uncertainty is more important than estimation risk, and investors who discard model uncertainty face large utility losses. Zhang, Kogan, and Gomes (2001) reconcile the ability of non-risk characteristics such as firm size and book-to-market to predict returns within a dynamic pricing paradigm. Firm characteristics can appear to predict stock returns because they may be correlated with the true conditional factor loadings, thereby motivating the scaling of betas by firm specific variables. They claim that "size and book-to-market play separate roles in describing the cross-section of returns. These firm characteristics appear to predict stock returns because they are correlated with the true conditional market beta of returns." Avramov and Chordia (2001) test whether the Zhang, Kogan, and Gomes (2001) scaling procedure improves the performance of the theoretically motivated CAPM and consumption CAPM. The evidence shows that equity characteristics often enter beta significantly. However, "characteristic scaled factor models" do not outperform their unscaled counterparts.
The poor performance of the CAPM has inspired multiple portfolio based factors.
The article that dealt the hardest blow to the CAPM was that published by Fama and French (1992) . This article showed that in the period , the correlation between stocks' returns and their betas was very small, while the correlation with the companies' size and their price/book value ratio was greater. They concluded "our tests do not support the most basic prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black Capital Asset Pricing Model that average stock returns are positively related to market betas." The authors divided the shares into portfolios and found that the cross-sectional variation in expected returns may be captured within a three-factor model, the factors being:
-the return on the market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate -a zero net investment portfolio that is long in high book-to-market stocks and short in low book-to-market stocks.
-a zero net investment portfolio that is long in small firm stocks and short in large firm stocks. However, Griffin (2002) concludes that there are no benefits to extending the Fama and French three-factor model to a global context. Country-specific three-factor models are more useful in explaining stock returns than are world and international versions. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that the size and book-to-market effects are due to investor overreaction rather than compensation for risk bearing. According to them, investors systematically overreact to corporate news, unrealistically extrapolating high or low growth into the future. This leads to underpricing of "value" (small capitalization, high book-to-market stocks) and overpricing of "growth" (large capitalization, low book-to-market stocks). Kothary, Shanken and Sloan (1995) point out that using historical betas estimated from annual rather than monthly returns produces a stronger relation between average return and historical beta. They also claim that the relation between book-to-market equity and average return observed by Fama and French (1992) and others is seriously exaggerated by survivor bias in the COMPUSTAT sample used. They also claim that the Fama and French statistical tests were of such low power that they could not reject a beta-related risk premium of 6% over the post-1940 period. Their most important conclusion, however, is that "our examination of the cross-section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9% per annum) for beta risk." Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995) find a "consistent and highly significant relationship between beta and cross-sectional portfolio returns." They insist that "the positive relationship between returns and beta predicted by CAPM is based on expected rather than realized returns. In periods where excess market returns are negative, an inverse relationship between beta and portfolio returns should exist." They test the following equation:
R it = γ 0t + γ 1t δ β i + γ 2t (1 -δ) β i + ε t where δ = 1 if (R Mt -R Ft ) > 0 (when market excess returns are positive) and δ = 0 if (R Mt -R Ft ) < 0 (when market excess returns are negative) γ 1 is estimated in periods with positive market excess returns and γ 2t is estimated in periods with negative market excess returns.
They use 660 monthly CRSP returns from 1936 to 1990. They estimate the betas using a five-year period and the CRSP equally-weighted index as a proxy for the market index. Based on the relative rankings of the estimated betas, securities are divided into 20 portfolios. They find a mean value of 0.0336 (t-statistic = 12.61) for γ 1 and -0.0337 (t-statistic = -13.82) for γ 2 . They say, "as expected, high beta portfolios incur lower returns during down markets (280 months) than low beta portfolios… and receive a positive risk premium during up markets (380 months)." They also remark that their results are very similar to those of Lakonishok and Shapiro (1984) , who found slope coefficients of γ 1 = -0.0333 and γ 2 = -0.0354. Elsas, El-Shaer and Theissen (2000) follow the Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995) methodology for the German market and find a positive and statistically significant relation between beta and return in our sample period 1960-1995 as well as in all subperiods we analyze. They claim, "Our empirical results provide a justification for the use of betas estimated from historical return data by portfolio managers." Fama and French (1996) argue that survivor bias does not explain the relation between book-to-market equity and average return. They conclude that historical beta alone cannot explain expected return. Kothary and Shanken (1999) insist on the fact that Fama and French (1992) tend to ignore the positive evidence on historical beta and to overemphasize the importance of bookto-market. They claim that, while statistically significant, the incremental benefit of size given beta is surprisingly small economically. They also claim that book-to-market is a weak determinant of the cross-sectional variation in average returns among large firms and it fails to account for return differences related to momentum and trading volume. Cremers (2001) claims that the data do not give clear evidence against the CAPM because it is difficult to reject the joint hypothesis that the CAPM holds and that the CRSP value-weighted index is efficient or a perfect proxy for the market portfolio. He also claims that the poor performance of the CAPM seems often due to measurement problems of the market portfolio and its beta. He concludes that "according to the data, the CAPM may still be alive." Bartholdy and Peare (2001) investigate the usefulness of the standard recommendation of using five years of monthly data and a value-weighted index for calculating the historical beta. They find that five years of monthly data and an equalweighted index provide the most efficient estimate of the historical beta. However, they find that the ability of historical betas to explain differences in returns in subsequent periods ranges from a low of 0.01% to a high of 11.73% across years, and at best 3% on average. Based on these results, they say "it may well be appropriate to declare beta dead." Chung, Johnson and Schill (2001) use size-sorted portfolio returns at daily, weekly, quarterly and semi-annual intervals and find in every case that the distribution of returns differs significantly from normality. They also show that adding systematic co-moments (not standard) of order 3 through 10 reduces the explanatory power of the Fama-French factors to insignificance in almost every case. Berglund and Knif (1999) propose an adjustment of the cross-sectional regressions of excess returns against betas to give larger weights to more reliable beta forecasts. They find a significant positive relationship between returns and the beta forecast when the proposed approach is applied to data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange, while the traditional Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach as such finds no relationship at all. Koutmos and Knif (2002) propose a dynamic vector GARCH model for the estimation of time-varying betas. They find that in 50% of the cases betas are higher during market declines (the opposite is true for the remaining 50%). They claim that the static market model overstates unsystematic risk by more than 10% and that dynamic betas follow stationary, mean reverting processes.
Merrill Lynch and Bloomberg adjust beta estimates in this very simple way:
Expected beta = 0.67 historical beta + 0.33
Summary statistics of the historical betas of the 30 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Betas with respect to the S&P 500, the DJIA and the W 5000. Betas are calculated each day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02 using 5 years of monthly data, i.e. on December 18, 2001, the beta is calculated by running a regression of the 60 monthly returns of the company on the 60 monthly returns of the corresponding index.
The returns of each month are calculated on the 18th of the month. The table contains the maximum, the minimum, the average, maximum minus minimum divided by the average, and maximum divided by the minimum of the 62 betas calculated every day in the period 1/12/01-31/1/02. 
